Summary

In the period of the crisis, the development of Slovenia stretched between the developments in the southern and eastern peripheries of the European Union. Gross domestic product in 2013 was about ten percent lower than it would have been if Slovenia followed the development of other "new" EU member states, and as much higher, if the country developed as the countries of EU "south". The collapse in 2009, caused by a fall in export demand, was unavoidable, while subsequent development  was largely stipulated by shortage of investments. The dynamics of the components of aggregate demand reveals mistakes in economic policy. The most fatal was sudden change in lending, triggered by the demagogic "fight" against tycoons which was destroying “their” companies, and indirectly the rest of the economy. The destruction was assisted by endless changes of legislation and unnecessary tightening of the regulation by BS, which increased uncertainty and risk. When the first signs of recovery emerged, ZUJF cut the demand of the households. A large balance of payments surplus in 2013 was generated by the fall or slower growth of imports rather than by growth in exports. It has nevertheless, and despite radical reduction of credits, enabled current economic recovery. The loan/deposit ratio has fallen almost to the level which existed before the gambling period in the years preceding economic crisis. Resilient economy, particularly small service sector dependent on domestic demand and unable to get loans apparently compensates them by increased mutual indebtedness and by settlement of receivables and payables with barter trading.

Key words: crisis, aggregate demand, monetary policy, fiscal policy;
JEL: E10, E50, E60