

Summary

A decrease in the tax administration efficiency after entering EU, as well as the increased tax competition in the EU, will prove to be the most significant short-term risks for the general government tax revenues. The optimal economic policy response to the increased tax competition and falling efficiency of the tax administration would be lower labour taxation (abolishing payroll tax), and simplified corporate income tax (all tax incentives have to be suppressed).

Economic policy must neutralize decrease in the tax revenue by reducing general government spending and not by increasing domestic taxes on goods and services. A higher taxation of the consumption (VAT and excise) would be acceptable only in the case of an increase in the consumption taxation in the euro countries or at least in the neighbouring euro countries.

Economic policy will not be able to neutralize decrease in the tax revenue merely by increasing the efficiency of public spending. It will be necessary to cut actual level of the public services. There is some room for cutting general government spending at investments. But the bulk of the public spending cutting would have to be made of transfers, to the business sector and households.

An increase in social transfer allocation efficiency (“database crossings”) will not result in noticeable savings. It would be necessary to reduce volume of the transfers. Apart from pensions, the smallest impact on the deterioration of the social protection would have a reduction in other direct transfers that are not part of the base social safety net. These transfers accounted for approximately 2% of GDP in 2004.

Parametric pension reform in 1999 enabled a slow, but tolerable and sustainable dynamic of age transfer normalization, for approximately 0.2% of GDP per year. The change in the pegging of the pensions made in 2005 will reverse the dynamics of normalization, in two years reform effects will be wiped out.

Povzetek

Zmanjševanje učinkovitosti davčnega administriranja po vključitvi v EU in povečana davčna konkurenca v EU bosta na kratek rok najbolj pomembni tveganji za javnofinančne prihodke.

Optimalen ekonomskopolitični odgovor na povečano davčno konkurenco in večjo neučinkovitost davčnega administriranja bi bilo zmanjšanje prevelike obdavčitve dela (ukinitvev davka na plačilno listo) in poenostavitev davka na dobiček (ukinitvev vseh investicijskih olajšav).

Zmanjšani davčni dohodek mora ekonomska politika nevtralizirati s krčenjem trošenja in ne s povečevanjem domačih davkov na blago in storitve. Večja obdavčitev trošenja bi bila sprejemljiva rešitev le v primeru povečane obdavčitve trošenja v državah evroobmočja ali vsaj pri sosednjih državah evroobmočja.

Zmanjšanje davčnega dohodka ekonomska politika ne bo mogla nadomestiti zgolj s povečano učinkovitostjo javnofinančnega trošenja, torej z manjšimi izdatki za enak obseg javnih storitev. Morala bo zmanjšati obseg javnih storitev. Največ prostora za krčenje javnofinančnega trošenja je pri transferjih, gospodarstvu in prebivalstvu.

Povečanje učinkovitosti dodeljevanja socialnih transferjev (»križanje podatkovnih baz«) ne bi omogočilo opaznih prihrankov. Potrebno bi bilo krčenje obsega transferjev. Razen pokojnin bi na poslabšanje socialnega položaja dohodkovno najnižjih razredov prebivalstva najmanj vplivalo zmanjševanje ostalih neposrednih transferjev, torej transferjev, ki ne štejejo v osnovno socialno mrežo. Ti transferji so leta 2004 predstavljali približno 2% BDP.

Parametrična pokojninska reforma je omogočila počasno (znosno) vendar vzdržno dinamiko normalizacije starostnih transferjev, približno 0.2% BDP na leto. Spremenjena indeksacija pokojnin bo učinek reforme izničila v dveh letih.